1. Explain the doctrine of ‘supervenience physicalism’ – *a.k.a.*, ‘minimal physicalism’.

2. Supervenience physicalism is best viewed as offering an answer to which question about physicalism:

(a) the completeness question (what does it mean to say that *everything* is physical?)

(b) the condition question (what does it mean to say that everything is *physical*?)

(c) the truth question (is physicalism *true*?)

3. What is the difference between reductive and non-reductive physicalism?

4. Describe the standard motivation for being a ‘non-reductive’ physicalism.

5. Do supervenience physicalists take a stand on the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalism or are they neutral on this question? Explain.

6. Describe a metaphysical possibility that non-reductive physicalism prohibits but that property dualism allows. Your answer should include the notion of supervenience.

7. What is ‘Hempel’s dilemma’ for physicalism?

8. According to Barbara Montero, can one accept Hempel’s dilemma without concluding that centuries of debate over the truth or falsity of physicalism have been a huge waste of time? Explain. (2 marks)

9. Explain David Papineau’s ‘causal argument’ for physicalism (*a.k.a.*, the ‘causal exclusion argument’). (Note: at least one of Papineau’s premises is unstated). (4 marks)

10. Why have some philosophers – notably, Jaegwon Kim – regarded the line of reasoning that you just outlined not as an argument for physicalism *per se* but for a specific, controversial version of physicalism. (2 marks)

11. According to Karen Bennett, who has the correct take on this issue?

a) Kim

b) Papineau

c) Neither

12. According to Bennett, which assumption of the causal argument – left unstated in Papineau’s original presentation – are physicalists in a position to reject? (1 mark)

13. What is the counterfactual conditional that, on Bennett’s view, is either false or vacuously true if physicalism is true. (A counterfactual conditional is a statement of the form ‘had x occurred, then y would have occurred’, where ‘x’ is some nonactual state of affairs.)

14. Explain why, according to Bennett, dualists – or, at least, dualists who concede the other premises in the causal argument – not able to take the same attitude that physicalists do toward the truth value of this counterfactual.

15. What do philosophers of mind mean when they speak of the ‘intentionality’ (*a.k.a.*, the ‘intentional content’ or ‘representational content’) of a mental state? (2 marks)

16. Considered as a type of relation (between the representing system and the represented object), intentionality can seem intuitively puzzling from a physicalist perspective. Give two examples to illustrate why this is so. (2 marks)

17. One way that physicalists have hoped to remove the air of mystery around the representational content of mental states is by regarding it as somehow composed of natural relations like reliable indication. What is ‘reliable indication’, and what might lead one to believe that it could contribute to explaining how mental states represent what they do?

18. There are two (closely related) objections to the claim we can explain the content of a mental representation solely in terms of what the representation reliably indicates (i.e., to the claim that X *represents* Y if and only if X *reliably indicates* Y). These are the ‘misrepresentation problem’ and the ‘disjunction problem’. Explain one of these problems, and the explanatory demand that it places on a successful theory of intentional/representational content. (3 marks)

19. Some theorists (e.g., Dretske, Millikan, and Neander) argue that we can answer the misrepresentation problem and disjunction problem by appealing to a mental representation’s evolved ‘proper function’ (*a.k.a.*, ‘teleofunction’). Describe one such proposal, and how it claims to overcome the problem you described above. [3 marks]

20. Raise an objection to the view you just described. (Your answer should indicate whether the objection targets the specific teleosemantic proposal you described in your answer to the previous question, the whole teleosemantic approach of using proper functions to explain a mental representation’s intentional content, or to the broader physicalist project of attempting to explain intentionality in non-intentional terms). [2 marks]

21. Fill in the blanks of the following argument from Descartes (‘The Conceivability Argument’).

P1. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my \_\_\_\_ existing without my \_\_\_\_ existing.

P2. Whatever is clearly and distinctly conceivable is \_\_\_\_.

C1. It is \_\_\_\_\_ for my \_\_\_\_\_ to exist without my \_\_\_\_ existing.

C2. My \_\_\_\_\_ is not my \_\_\_\_\_.

22. Describe the influential objection to Descartes’ conceivability argument associated with the reductive physicalist, J.C.C. Smart. (Note while we did not read Smart’s paper, we discussed it in lecture when introducing Kripke). [3 marks]

23. Explain why, according to Kripke, this influential physicalist response to the conceivability argument fails.

24. “But a statement like “water is nothing but a collection of H2O molecules” *appears* contingent. Though the statement is (let us suppose) true, we can easily imagine – or conceive of – it being false.” What is Kripke’s response to this?

25. According to Kripke, could one offer the same analysis for a statement like “pain is nothing but a certain pattern of neural activation (e.g., C-fiber activation or whatever type of neural event is discovered to systematically correlate with subjective reports of pain)”? Explain.

26. Explain Frank Jackson’s ‘knowledge argument’ against physicalism.

27. What is the specific version of anti-physicalism that Jackson goes on to endorse on the basis of this argument?

1. Interactionist substance dualism (‘Type-D anti-physicalism’)
2. Epiphenomenalism (‘Type-E anti-physicalism’)
3. Russellian monism/panpsychism (‘Type-F monism’)

28. Describe the two dominant strategies that physicalists have pursued in response to Jackson’s knowledge argument. (Note: your answer name the different versions of physicalism and specify which premises of the argument the physicalist response attacks).

29. Identify one (at least prima facie) reason to prefer one of these versions of physicalism over the other. (Note: either version of physicalism is acceptable, but the motivation that you give for it should be an accurate one).

30. BONUS (for 1 mark): Describe one idea that you had not seriously considered prior to taking this class. (You can interpret ‘idea’ broadly to include an observation, a question, a theoretical possibility, etc.) (1 mark)

31. BONUS (for 1 mark): In your own view, is there a recurring shortcoming or flaw running through the material that we have studied in this class? (1 mark)

32. BONUS (for 1 mark): The topic I enjoyed the MOST was …. And the topic I enjoyed the LEAST was …

33. BONUS (for 1 mark): One issue or question that I wish we had discussed (or discussed in more detail than we did) is …